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Abstract — Community based wildlife management in Zimbabwe is rooted in ideas of global 
significance whose central premise is that local communities will manage natural resources 
sustainably when rights and responsibilities are devolved to them; benefits of management exceed 
costs; they capture benefits; and they are small enough in membership to enforce group rules.  
Using results of research conducted in Chiriwo Ward, Mbire district, this paper revisits these core 
principles.  Six years after CIRAD handed over Chivaraidze Game Ranch to the community, the 
project is revealing a schism between the aforesaid principles and actual practice.  First, the ideal of 
devolving authority over wildlife to the community has come up against powerful local sectional 
interests.  Second, the ideal of benefits of management exceeding costs is being contradicted by 
the reality of costs exceeding benefits.  Third, the ideal of the community capturing benefits is being 
negated by the reality of elite capture of benefits.  Fourth, the ideal of community cohesion is being 
neutralised by local leaders’ divisive use of kinship and party political ties to gain access to and 
control the ranch and its wildlife.  On the basis of comparative literature and our own findings, we 
argue for the necessity to investigate and analyse the politics behind project appropriation at the 
local level.  We conclude that building community collective action in wildlife management requires 
scrutiny and understanding of power politics which shapes local participation and structures the 
outcomes of wildlife management.  
Key words: community based game ranching; politics of appropriation; benefits; costs; networks, 
elite capture, Zimbabwe  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In Zimbabwe, community based natural resource management (CBNRM) took root in the late 
1980s onwards under the flagship Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).  CAMPFIRE’s conceptual premise is that local 
communities will sustainably manage natural resources when: rights and responsibilities to 
protect and use wildlife (and other natural) resources are devolved to them as managers; 
benefits of managing the natural resources exceed the costs; communities enter into 
business partnerships with the private sector; benefits of wildlife conservation are captured 
by the local communities as resource managers; communities are small enough in 
membership to be cohesive and to enforce conformity to group defined rules (Martin, 1986; 
Murphree, 1990; 1991/1992; Hulme & Murphree, 2001).   
Martin’s (1986) formulation envisaged village communities forming natural resource 
cooperatives in which inhabitants would obtain legal proprietorship of wildlife as shareholders 
and profits would be used for communal benefit or shared among the individual 
shareholders.  State bureaucrats resisted devolution, but a decentralisation compromise was 
reached in 1988 and Guruve and Nyaminyami district councils received appropriate authority 
status (Murphree, 1990).  The councils determined, subject to restrictions imposed by 
government, schemes of wildlife utilisation in their areas of jurisdiction (Mapedza & Bond, 
2006).  The two councils began earning revenue by leasing sport hunting and non-
consumptive tourism rights to private sector operators (Taylor, 2009) but they too remained 
reluctant to devolve power over wildlife and benefits to sub-district levels (Murombedzi, 
1991).   
Inspired by CAMPFIRE’s philosophical insights, CIRAD supported the establishment 
of Chivaraidze Game Ranch (CGR) in Chiriwo Ward from 1996 to 2004 under the French 
funded Biodiversity Conservation Project (Le Bel et al 2004).  At the same time, and through 
the financial support of USAID, Chiriwo ward also established the Karunga Hunting Camp, 
managed by the Karunga Community Development Trust which it leased, and continues to 
lease, to the safari operator awarded a hunting concession in the area by the district council.  
The council and ward both receive revenue from this lease arrangement.  The game ranch 
project sought to offer an alternative to this classic CAMPFIRE sport hunting arrangement.  
The project followed closely Martin’s (1986) original formulation of CAMPFIRE and sought to 
establish a cooperative company whose shareholding would be held by all the households in 
the ward but, as we shall see, this stirred up unexpected political dynamics.  
Using the case of CGR, and comparative evidence from other districts, this paper 
revisits the foundational ideas informing CBNRM in Zimbabwe and contributes to the ongoing 
debate on their potency at the local level.  The paper is based on primary and secondary 
research.  Primary research involved ethnographic interviews, first hand observations and 
analysis of political strategies.  Secondary research comprised the review of past and 
present project documents.  The paper begins by situating the case study within Zimbabwe’s 
legislative and policy context.  It then describes the study area; provides a brief history of 
CGR and outlines important institutions obtaining in Chiriwo ward.  Results from our 
investigation are discussed in the light of empirical evidence from other wards and districts in 
Zimbabwe and we conclude that it is the specifics of differential meanings, power politics and 
contestations that are crucial to understanding the outcomes of CBNRM in rural Africa.  
 
2. CONTEXT  
Among the many factors conducive to the establishment of CBNRM in the Mid-Zambezi 
Valley during the 1980s four contextual factors can be discerned namely the eradication of 
tsetse fly (Glossina spp.), the abundance of biodiversity in the valley, the installation of 
favourable legislative and policy frameworks and donor support to state and non–state 
agencies.  The eradication of tsetse fly during the late 1980s created favourable conditions 
for the rapid expansion of human settlements and agriculture in the Mid-Zambezi Valley 
which threatened to take away wildlife habitats (Le Bel et al. 2004).  The increase in 
cultivated zones was accompanied by a decline in game species (Fritz et al. 2003) and this 
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threat opened opportunities for establishing CAMPFIRE.  The 1982 amendment to the Parks 
and Wildlife Act of 1975 enabled the Minister of Environment to confer appropriate authority 
on rural district councils as managers of wildlife in communal areas (Murphree, 1990) and 
this formed the spring board for the articulation of a sustainable wildlife use policy that found 
concrete expression in CAMPFIRE.  The Prime Minister’s decree of 1984 led to the creation 
of village, ward and district development committees as focal points of development 
planning.  These new entities ran parallel to traditional institutions comprising chiefs, 
headmen and spirit mediums.  By 2001 donor support had helped to roll out CAMPFIRE in 
37 out of the 57 districts in the country (Taylor, 2009). 
 
2.1. The study area  
Chiriwo ward covers a total area of 718 km2; its altitude is 340-420m above sea level and its 
mean annual rainfall of 620-680 mm supports dry land cultivation of cotton and food crops 
(Le Bel et al. 2004).  The ward’s population 10 621 people (Ward Office, 13 July 2009) is 
spread across 24 traditional village clusters of which the largest cluster, Gonono, has a 
secondary school, a health centre and retail shops.  The people in Chiriwo ward, as in the 
rest of the Zambezi Valley, are vulnerable to recurrent droughts and most depend on food 
aid.  The ward is covered by dry forests and woodlands but along the Kadzi River the dense 
forest supports a range of floral and avian species.  The vegetation in the ward is of great 
biodiversity conservation interest and is an important refuge for wildlife (Fritz et al. 2003).  
 
2.2. Brief history of Chivaraidze Game Ranch (CGR) 
The CGR project was established under the Biodiversity Conservation Project funded by 
FFEM from 1996 to 2004, the details of which are as follows.  
 
Box 1: CIRAD and the Chivaraidze Game Ranch 
CIRAD undertook feasibility studies between 1988 and 1995 which culminated in the setting up the game ranch in 
1996.  With the blessing of local leaders and residents, an area covering 3 200 ha was set aside.  The size of the 
ranch was influenced by financial constraints and the need to provide game meat.  The ranch’s wild animals 
initially consisted of small populations of impalas, kudus, duikers, warthogs and bush pigs, representing the 
community’s contribution valued at US$35 000.  From 1999 to 2002, 509 impalas and a mixed population of 200 
head of zebras, wildebeests, sables, tsessebes, waterbucks and elands were translocated valued at over US$81 
000.  Three boreholes were sunk and infrastructure such as butchery, office and storerooms constructed.  A 
tractor, trailer and basic ranch equipment, and horses were bought and game guards equipped with rifles and 
portable VHF radios to ensure security.  The institutional framework of the ranch was established in phases with 
the assistance of a capacity building NGO, the Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST) and the district council.  In October 
2000, the CGR became a CAMPFIRE company and this enabled it to open a bank account.  A new constitution 
defined the company’s mandate in five clauses, that is, (1) the provision of game meat at reduced prices, (2) the 
reduction of poaching, (3) job creation, (4) the creation of wealth and (5) the search for financial viability and 
ecological sustainability.  In January 2002, a wildlife exploitation contract was signed with a private safari operator 
and this was followed in June 2003 by the first trophy sport hunting and cropping of wild animals.  In November 
2003, the ranch transformed itself into a cooperative company with help from ZIMTRUST.  In April 2004, when 
CIRAD handed over the ranch, the cooperative company was formally registered and a 12-member board of 
directors elected.  The idea of households buying shares in the company foundered on the rock of local politics.  
Between 2005 and 2007 the cooperative company experienced internal instability arising from power struggles 
between itself and the ward leadership.  Most of the trained workers left the ranch and politically loyal but 
inexperienced staff was recruited.  The performance of the ranch declined amidst increased poaching of wildlife.  
This was compounded by the general economic and political crisis in the country.  In 2008, the cooperative 
company was informally merged with the Karunga Community Development Trust to form the Karunga-
Chivaraidze Cooperative Company (KCCC).  This new outfit has not yet been formally registered but it has a 
unified management and board of directors.   
Sources: Chardonnet & Le Bel (1998); Le Bel et al. (2004) 
 
 
2.3. Institutions in Chiriwo Ward 
Interlocking institutions in Chiriwo ward include traditional leaders; a ZANU-PF party affiliated 
councillor; a ward development committee (WADCO); Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC); and the Karunga-Chivaraidze Cooperative Company (KCCC).  The Chief and 
headman do not live in Chiriwo ward and to fill this ‘void’ the councillor mobilises village 
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heads to elect a leader every 5 years and this leader effectively becomes the ward’s deputy 
councillor.  The WADCO consists of the councillor who chairs its meetings, the ward 
secretary, district chairpersons of ZANU-PF, chairperson of ZANU-PF’s war veterans, all the 
24 traditional village heads and their respective secretaries, and chairpersons of projects.  In 
Chiriwo ward the formal political structures of the MDC were not readily apparent but during 
the 2008 an MDC candidate reportedly contested the councillorship and lost narrowly to a 
ZANU-PF candidate.  The KCCC is accountable to the WADCO.  Its organisational structure 
comprises a 12-member board which elects its own chairman, secretary and finance 
committee.  Below the board is a management team led by the company manager, a finance 
officer, a clerk, a security sergeant, a supervisor of two game guards and two fence minders.  
Institutions carry different meanings for different social actors and in Chiriwo ward, the 
power struggles between various institutional actors is strongly influenced by ZANU-PF but 
the MDC is making its presence felt. 
 
3. RESULTS 
This section presents what we found out about the wildlife ranch, villagers’ perceptions of 
how things were during CIRAD’s presence, how things are at the moment; why things have 
become what they are today and the political strategies used by the political elite to 
appropriate CGR for sectional benefit.  
 
3.1. What was then…? 
Ordinary villagers in the ward and former and current CGR leaders recalled the golden years 
of the project (1996-2004) when CIRAD was involved and the turmoil and crisis that gripped 
it after CIRAD left at the end of the Biodiversity Conservation Project.  They remembered 
how ordinary villagers were selected by traditional village heads in different parts of the ward 
to provide casual and permanent labour at the ranch and how the income earned helped to 
sustain their families.  They recollected with a sense of nostalgia how they used to buy game 
meat at low prices and how a Land Rover distributed meat to remote villages.  
 
Box 2: Game cropped in 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Le Bel et al. (2004).  
 
CIRAD provided considerable quantities of game meat to the community and CGR almost 
broke even financially during 2003.  Local people remembered how, when CIRAD was 
present, CGR had a functional game meat butchery, equipment and boreholes.  They 
recalled how a tractor ferried them to work at the ranch and brought them back.   
The few game guards at the ranch recollected how patrolled CGR on horse-back to 
monitor wildlife, water points and poaching.  They remembered hunting using a Land Rover; 
how carcasses were transported to the butchery where meat was processed hygienically, 
stored in deep freezers and sold.  They recalled receiving fair wages.  They remembered 
with a sense of pride how CGR teemed with various plains game animals.  
 
3.2. What is now…? 
Out of a cropping quota of 160 game animals allocated by the National Parks and Wildlife Management 
Authority, 133 were cropped in order to provide meat to people living in and outside Chiriwo ward.  In all, five 
tonnes of meat were produced in 2003 of which 2.5 tonnes came from impalas; 1.3 tonnes from wildebeest and 
1.2 tonnes from kudus.  Three quarters of the meat was sold fresh at an average price of US$0.50 per kg.  
Some of the meat was given to ranch employees and the remainder was dried and sold at US$2.00 per kg.  
About 57% of the meat was sold in Chiriwo ward and the remaining 43% was sold to neighbouring wards.   
In 2003, the ranch’s costs were US$12 170 and its income was US$10, 138; the ranch therefore had a 
shortfall of US$2 032.  The expenditure of the sum of US$12 170 consisted of 42% running costs; 30% staff 
and administration; 11% cooperative company and training; 15% infrastructure and maintenance and 2% 
purchase of equipment.  The sources of income were 62.5% sport hunting; 32% sale of game meat; and 2% 
was generated from secondary activities which included market gardening, hiring out of the tractor and hunting 
camp.   
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Now, ordinary men and women and leaders of CGR are disillusioned by the present status of 
CGR which they say is a far cry from what it was during CIRAD’s presence.  They see a 
motionless tractor at the ranch offices which has one wheel missing because the ward 
councillor gave it to Mbire Rural District Council.  They do not see the tractor-drawn trailer 
and tow grader because the councillor also gave these assets to the rural district council in 
order to position himself for the post of council chairman which he now occupies.  They see a 
dysfunctional Land Rover vehicle whose parts the councillor took away saying that he was 
going to buy replacements but that was never done.  They do not see the six horses because 
all of them died from starvation and disease.   
Villagers see most of the wild animals roaming outside CGR because poachers and 
natural floods breached the perimeter fence and most animals escaped.  Ranch workers are 
spending months on end without receiving salaries because CGR has no money and to 
offset this deficit they reportedly poach wildlife and sell the meat.  CGR has no money to pay 
casual labourers who made fire guards and now wild fires destroy the vegetation on which 
wild animals.  
The original hope that the sale of game meat at low prices would reduce poaching still 
has to be realised.  The meat from the few animals that CGR crops is mostly bought by 
villagers who live near CGR; most ward members have no access to legal game meat.   
The Safari Operator whose license to hunt in CGR was meant to help it realize more 
income from trophy hunting has never fully utilized the quota allocated by the Parks and 
Wildlife Management Authority.  This is an important fact explaining the weakness of CGR 
before and after it was handed over to the community after 2004.  Without a strong and 
regular income from trophy hunting, CGR was in a weak position, susceptible to high-jacking 
by political leaders.   
 
3.3. Why have things come to be what they are today…? 
The Zimbabwe politico-economic crisis has had a deleterious impact on CAMPFIRE (Balint 
and Mashinya, 2006) and associated community based projects like CGR.  These contextual 
factors have, over time, coalesced with local politics to get CGR to where it is today.  To 
understand these issues, we need to analyze power politics, institutions and actors involved, 
their networks and their ideological justifications for appropriating CGR and then going off at 
odds with the ideals of CAMPFIRE and democratic governance. 
CGR has been bedevilled by power struggles between the ward councillor, DK and 
successive chairmen of the ranch’s boards.  During the period 2001-2009, CGR has had six 
boards of directors, that is, six boards in the space of eight years.  Most of the experienced 
ranch workers lost their jobs and inexperienced staff appointed on grounds of political loyalty, 
kinship and neighbourhood ties.  The central actors have been the ward councillor, DK, the 
ZANU-PF dominated WADCO and traditional village leaders.  DK’s political strategies and 
networks are critical in understanding how and why CGR has been appropriated for sectional 
interest.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ha
l-0
05
25
55
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
2 
O
ct
 2
01
0
Community based game ranching and politics in Chiriwo Ward of Mbire district, Zimbabwe 
(Mombeshora, S & Le Bel, S) 
ISDA 2010, Montpellier, June 28-30, 2010 6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1: DK’s political strategies 
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DK’s multiple political strategies include using the WADCO to disrupt, override and dissolve 
CGR boards; fighting against transparency and casting aspersions against rivals; deploying 
informers; co-opting and subsuming village heads and political rivals; using marriage to 
create crucial political alliances; creating ties with senior ZANU-PF politicians; withholding 
important information from traditional leaders; and discriminating against some local 
residents.  
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Child (2009) argues that the poor performance of CBNRM in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa 
arises from the weak implementation of the principles informing grassroots conservation and 
not from the weakness of the principles themselves.  Be that as it may, CGR reveals a 
chasm between the ideals of CAMPFIRE and actual practice especially with regard to 
devolution, benefits vis-à-vis costs, benefit sharing and community cohesion.  
 
4.1. Devolution of rights vs. dominant local interests 
A diacritical feature of CBNRM in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere in southern Africa, is the ideal of 
devolving from the state to local communities bundles of rights over wildlife, fisheries, forests, 
water and so on (Barrow & Murphree, 2001).  The argument is that if natural resources, in 
this instance wildlife, are managed at the local level by communities, then they will be looked 
after better because local systems of accountability are more effective and transparent than 
centralised ones (SLSA Team, 2003).   
Such arguments, cut through, show the evident neglect of the politics of appropriation 
of conservation and development projects which is itself embedded in wider institutions of 
governance.  As Diagram 1 shows, grassroots wildlife ranching is significantly shaped by 
relations of party politics, kinship affiliation and identity.  In Child’s (2009) argument, space 
for power politics is constricted by focusing on the moral imperative of empowering the rural 
poor without paying attention to who actually gets empowered and who loses out.  In Chiriwo 
ward, it is the ZANU-PF leadership and its supporters who hold sway over CGR and who 
cream off the benefits. 
 
4.2. Benefits perceived to exceed costs vs. costs perceived to exceed benefits 
Another quintessential idea behind the creation and operation of CAMPFIRE is that rural 
people will care to protect and use wildlife when the benefits of doing so are perceived to 
exceed the costs (Murphree, 1991/1992).  Following Emerton (2001) we see benefits of 
wildlife as consisting of use and non-use values.  Whilst use values can be further 
segmented into direct and indirect values, non-use values mainly comprise the existence 
value of wildlife.   
CGR’s direct use values include hunting quotas, meat, jobs, political patronage and 
agro-services.  As pointed out above CGR’s hunting quotas were never really fully utilised by 
the safari operator.  Lack of safari hunting has trapped CGR in a cycle of low income and, 
low maintenance of assets.  A significant direct benefit of CGR has been the provision of jobs 
to some local residents.  The beneficiaries include the cooperative board members who 
receive sitting allowances for attending meetings, the management and ordinary workers 
who are trying to make CGR resilient by increasing anti-poaching patrols.   
CGR was meant to provide indirect benefits in the form of ecological and 
environmental services associated with wildlife and its habitat.  These include the 
conservation of woodlands and bushes, grasses, natural water sources, soils and the 
sequestration of carbon (Emerton, 2001).  Wild fires are compromising the conservation of 
wildlife and its habitats.  The conservation of wildlife is also being hampered by poachers 
who cut the perimeter fence and use it to snare wild animals.   
A few Chiriwo Ward residents pointed out the existence values of wildlife (Binot et al, 
2009).  They observed that Chiriwo ward could become a hub for community-based game 
ranching if CGR is .revived.  Children in the ward grow up knowing at first hand the different 
ha
l-0
05
25
55
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
2 
O
ct
 2
01
0
Community based game ranching and politics in Chiriwo Ward of Mbire district, Zimbabwe 
(Mombeshora, S & Le Bel, S) 
ISDA 2010, Montpellier, June 28-30, 2010 8
species of plains game in CGR.  Most adults regard the wildlife in CGR as part of their local 
heritage.   
However, there is a growing clear-headed perception that the direct and indirect costs 
of this wildlife venture are exceeding benefits and that these costs are spread unevenly 
among ward residents.  The direct costs of CGR include staff salaries and wages, the 
maintenance and repair of equipment and infrastructure.  The cooperative company’s 
financial statement for the period January-June 2009 shows that it generated US$3 220.50 
when estimates for repairing various assets amount to US$50 000.00.  Clearly, the direct 
costs of operating CGR exceed what it currently is able to generate.   
The indirect or opportunity costs are the crops and livestock production options that 
local people forgo in order to keep and sustain CGR.  The ranch imposes opportunity costs 
on ward residents subtracting potential sources of subsistence livelihoods such as wood fuel, 
pasture, crop land and medicines and imposes the burden of crop damage by wildlife.  
Villagers living near CGR argue that they are bearing the full burden of crop raiding by 
wildlife and yet they are excluded from leadership positions at CGR because they are 
immigrants.  They prefer converting the wildlife habitat inside CGR into agro-pastoral land 
from which they can derive direct benefits. 
Clearly, there is an abiding tension between the vision of benefits exceeding costs 
and the lived reality of costs exceeding benefits and significant segments of the population 
perceive themselves as being in a worse pickle because they are not deriving any benefits.  
In their view, the primary beneficiaries of CGR are the cavalier political leadership and its 
supporters.   
 
4.3. Local community capturing benefits of management vs. elite capture of benefits 
In Chiriwo ward as in Mahenye ward in Chipinge district, Nenyunga ward in Gokwe North 
district and in Nyaminyami district, power politics is central to understanding who captures 
benefits and who loses from wildlife management initiatives.   
In Mahenye in Chipinge district, the ZANU-PF aligned traditional leadership has 
usurped power and control over the project and its finances from the elected leadership 
(Rihoy et al., 2007).  They no longer apply participatory decision-making because they make 
the decisions and then inform ‘their people’ about how CAMPFIRE money has been 
allocated (Balint & Mashinya, 2006).  The withdrawal of NGOs and government agencies has 
opened space for traditional leaders to assert power, influence and control over ‘community’ 
wildlife resources.  
Mapedza & Bond (2006) explain that in Gokwe North ZANU-PF political processes 
have extended right down to local institutions to the extent that the party has become an 
important gate-keeper of most wildlife conservation activities.  In Nenyunga ward, the ZANU-
PF aligned local councillor and chief do not allow immigrants to contest elections for fear that 
key political positions might be taken over.  The councillor accuses immigrants of belonging 
to the MDC thereby forestalling their election to CAMPFIRE committees.  Significantly, Chief 
Nenyunga and the ward councillor have used their positions to access and appropriate 
CAMPFIRE resources for their own benefit (Mapedza & Bond, 2006).   
In Nyaminyami district, CAMPFIRE is now characterised by unaccountable power 
structures, lack of community benefits and council’s ineffective response to human-wildlife 
conflicts (Balint & Mashinya (2008).  The ward wildlife committees are largely seen as rubber 
stamps to ZANU-PF councillors who are feared by local people because of the threat of 
violence.  Nyaminyami councillors appropriate ward-level CAMPFIRE revenues for personal 
perquisites. Meanwhile CAMPFIRE funded community projects such as grinding mills; 
schools and a butcher shop are in decline because councillors capture benefits (Balint & 
Mashinya, 2008).  .  
These examples demonstrate that the application of the model of devolved natural 
resource governance triggers-off important power contestations whose results shape access 
to and control of wildlife benefits by local political elites.  By overlooking the centrality of 
power politics, state and non-state agencies and actors overestimate the capacity of the 
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participatory ‘democratic’ approach to deliver conservation and development benefits more 
equitably and effectively (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003).   
 
4.4. Internal community cohesion vs. divisive use of kinship and party political ties  
Barrow and Murphree (2001) maintain that internal community cohesion is the social glue 
which persuades people, in spite of their differences, to act collectively to enhance mutual 
interests and to represent these interests to others.  Earlier on Murphree (1991/1992) argued 
that natural resource management institutions work better if the community is small enough 
in membership size for members to be in occasional face-to-face contact to enforce 
conformity to rules through peer pressure. 
This construction of ‘community’ overlooks the fact that social life organised through 
kinship is also conflict ridden.  As this paper has tried to show, the common ethnicity and 
geography of Chiriwo residents is seen through disputes over who is actually the ‘authentic’ 
member of the community; who should gain access to and control wildlife and benefits and 
who should be excluded (Brockington et al. 2008).  Kinship, ethnicity and affinities to political 
parties are all fault lines along which struggles over access to wildlife resources, meanings, 
institutional legitimacy and control are occurring in Chiriwo ward.  The management of CGR 
is therefore embedded in contested power relations whose contingent constellations may pull 
in different directions.  This renders elusive the attainment of the ideal of a socially cohesive 
community in Chiriwo ward and with it the realisation of a unitary logic of game ranching.   
 
5. CONCLUSION  
We have argued, on the basis of the Chiriwo ward’s experience, and also on the basis of 
evidence from Mahenye ward, Nenyunga ward and Nyaminyami district in Zimbabwe, that it 
is the politics of project appropriation that is central to understanding the outcomes of wildlife 
management.  By concentrating the optic on local actors, their life-worlds, the strategies they 
use to gain access to wildlife projects, the ideas they marshal to legitimate their actions, we 
are better able to see the disconnect between the policy vision of equitable ‘democratic’ 
participation and the existential realities of elite capture.  Focusing on actors and their 
strategic actions gives us a better handle on differential power, meanings and political 
processes triggered by donor supported projects which despite being technical successes 
can be vitiated by local power struggles.  The policy ambition of devolving wildlife 
management to local communities has to contend with the realities of predatory sectional 
interests which policy actors cannot afford to ignore.   
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